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Abstract: This paper sets up a model to account for differences in total factor productivity due to differences in 
enforcement of contracts. Vertical specialization generates the need for intra-period credit, because final goods 
producers cannot pay their intermediate goods suppliers before they produce their final good. The paper shows that 
if there are enforcement problems, the capital distribution is skewed in the sense that intermediate goods producers 
operate at lower capital levels and higher marginal products of capital than final goods producers. This wedge is 
created by the price for intermediate goods, which is lower in economies with bad enforcement. For this reason, the 
high-productivity firms in the intermediate goods sector have no incentive to grow and the low-productivity firms in 
the final goods sector, benefiting from low intermediate goods prices, have no incentive to shrink, which causes 
productivity to be lower in countries with bad enforcement. 
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Why are certain countries poor and stay that way? The neoclassical growth model
predicts that poor countries, even if living in autarky from the rest of the world, should
rapidly catch up to industrialized countries. In the presence of perfect international
capital markets this process would even take place instantaneously as capital ﬂows to
the countries with low capital endowment and high interest rates in order to equalize
interest rates across countries.
All this requires that technology across countries is identical. Prescott (1997)
therefore raises the point that a theory explaining diﬀerences in production functions
across nations, in particular diﬀerences in total factor productivity, is needed. This
paper attempts to develop a theory of diﬀerences in TFP that have their origin in
incomplete contract enforcement.
We set up a dynamic general equilibrium model to examine the role played by
incomplete enforcement of intra-period trade credit contracts. Output is produced
in a sequence of intermediate production stages. Due to a beneﬁt to specialization
every ﬁrm concentrates its activity to the production of one single stage. Firms in
each stage except the initial one purchase the intermediate good of the previous stage
using trade credit and sell their output to the ﬁrms in the next stage, receiving trade
credit of that ﬁrm in exchange. That is, rather than looking at enforcement problems
pertaining to long term borrowing contracts we look at default risk within the chain
1of intra-period trade credit.
A real world example for this chain of credit would be the two intermediate goods:
iron ore and steel, and the ﬁnal good automobiles. Iron ore is an input in the steel
production and steel is an input in the automobile production. The model implicitly
assumes that there is a beneﬁt to specialization, that is, every ﬁrm in this economy
specializes in only one sector of the economy. Car producers, therefore, would never
buy iron ore to produce the steel themselves. Instead they purchase steel in the
intermediate goods market.
There is, by the way, plenty of evidence that vertical specialization in the real
world is far more advanced than the relatively coarse grid of intermediate stages iron
ore - steel - automobiles. Kei-Mu Yi (2001) shows that there is specialization even
across countries that can account for the recent boost to international trade. He
shows that eﬀects of declines in tariﬀs are magniﬁed if intermediate goods cross the
border several times. Given that producers are even willing to pay tariﬀs by shipping
goods across borders several times clearly indicates that there must be some payoﬀ
to specialization.
Why do ﬁrms use trade credit? Notice that in a standard macro model with a
sequence of intermediate goods as described above there would be no borrowing and
lending other than potential long term borrowing contracts for ﬁnancing of ﬁrms. In
this paper however, I assume that the intra-period timing of production stages requires
2intra-period debt contracts. To stay with the iron ore-steel-automobile example, the
stage 1 producer hands over 100 units of iron ore to the steel producer. Let the
relative price of iron ore to cars be 0.2, then the steel producer pays with a promise
to deliver 20 cars. Next, the steel producer produces 100 units of steel and sells it
to the car manufacturer at a relative price of 0.5, that is, he gets a promise from the
car manufacturer over 50 cars. Next, the car manufacturer uses the steel to make
100 cars. He then gives 50 cars to the steel manufacturer who in turn gives 20 cars
to the iron ore producer. In the model there is default risk on the obligations of the
automobile producer and the steel producer. More precisely, contracts have to be
designed to be individually rational, that is, in such a way that the car manufacturer
does not decide to run away without paying 50 cars to the steel producer and the
steel producer does not run away without handing over 20 cars as payment for the
iron ore he received.
The timing of production creates debt relationships that would not exist in a macro
model where one assumes that factor payments, production, revenues, and proﬁts all
occur simultaneously. In my model the ﬁrm that produces ﬁrst, receives its factor
payments and therefore, its proﬁts, last. Note that the total amount of intra-period
debt outstanding increases with the number of production stages. Intra-period debt
can reach any multiple of ﬁnal production, if we add enough stages. Suppose there
were N diﬀerent stages and the relative price of stage i is i/N. The trade credit of a
3ﬁrm in sector i it owes to the sector i−1 ﬁrms is then (i − 1)/N. The total amount of
debt relative to the ﬁnal product is then
 N
i=1 (i − 1)/N =( N − 1)/2. This is quite
intuitive: The more stages we use for production the more leveraged ﬁrms become
with respect to their intermediate goods purchases, and consequently the amount of
credit relative to output increases.
There is some evidence that trade credit in fact plays a big role in the real world,
in particular in developing countries. Cardoso (2002) points out that of all ﬁrms
in Mexico that use credit, 40% use trade credit as their main source of ﬁnancing.
According to Ickes (1998) promissory notes, called veksels, are very wide spread in
Russia. Large enterprises like natural gas or oil producers purchase inputs like ma-
chinery with notes denominated in natural gas or oil for a number of reasons: First,
the exact same timing problem as mentioned above applies and the veksel gives the
ability to pay for inputs before the ﬁrm’s own production and revenue take place.
Second, promissory notes are the perfect tax evasion vehicles for ﬁrms that face es-
sentially 100% marginal tax rates, which is the case in many developing countries.
Third, ﬁrms might not be able to get large cash loans from a bank due the bank’s
fear that funds are diverted oﬀshore and never paid back.
The main theoretical result is that with identical initial capital endowments a
country with poor enforcement will end up in a lower steady state than a country
with eﬀective enforcement. The risk of default on credit induces two distinct chan-
4nels of ineﬃciency: First, and most obvious, ﬁrms in the sectors that use intermediate
goods and purchase them with trade credit might operate below capacity because they
cannot get as much trade credit to purchase intermediate goods as they want to. Sec-
ond, the pricing of intermediate goods might create perverse incentives: Intermediate
goods producers operate with low capital levels and have a large marginal product,
however they do not accumulate more capital because the retail price for intermediate
goods is going to be low in an economy with bad enforcement. On the other hand
ﬁnal goods producers over-accumulate capital: They operate with large amounts of
capital at low marginal product, and they are willing to do so, because the markup
between intermediate goods and ﬁnal goods is large.
This paper is related to Quintin’s (2000) work. In his paper, entrepreneurs can be
characterized by a two-dimensional vector consisting of their productivity and their
credit-worthiness which is modelled endogenously. In the benchmark economy with
perfect enforcement, only the most productive individuals are able to get ﬁnancing in
order to run a ﬁrm, regardless of their credit-worthiness. With incomplete enforce-
ment, however, there is an ineﬃcient allocation of ﬁrm ﬁnancing: Relatively unpro-
ductive ﬁrms exist, just because their entrepreneurs happened to be credit-worthy,
and relatively productive entrepreneurs who happen to be not credit-worthy cannot
run a ﬁrm and have work in the labor force instead.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the model
5and deﬁnes equilibrium. Section 3 derives results about steady states including a
numerical example. A theoretical contribution of this baseline model is that steady
states so not have to be unique. Therefore, sections 4 shows how to pin down a unique
steady state by introducing capital markets. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2M o d e l
The model I consider is an extremely stylized environment with inﬁnite horizon and
no uncertainty. Time is discrete and indexed by t =0 ,1,2,...
The economy is populated by a measure one of inﬁnitely-lived households who






where 0 <β<1 and u satisﬁes the usual Inada conditions. Each household has a
production technology and an initial capital and labor endowment (k0,l 0). Labor is
assumed to be ﬁxed at lt =1for all households and all periods. Initially, I assume
that production factors are non-tradable, even though this assumption will be relaxed
later. That is, every household starts with an initial capital endowment k0 and labor
endowment l =1 . Then over time households can accumulate more capital if they
desire, but only through personal savings, not through borrowing.
For simplicity I assume there are only two sectors, one intermediate goods sector,
called sector 1, and one ﬁnal goods sector, called sector 2. This model, therefore, is
6even simpler than the 3 goods economy mentioned in the introduction, but it still
delivers the desired results, at least qualitatively.
The output of a sector 1 ﬁrm is:
y1 = f (k)
where f satisﬁes the usual assumptions:f(0) = 0,f￿(0) = ∞,f￿ (∞)=0 ,f￿￿ (k) < 0.
Output in sector 2, the ﬁnal goods sector, is a function of both capital and interme-
diate goods x1 :
y2 = y2(x1,k)=m i n{x1,f(k)}
That is, in order to produce one unit of the ﬁnal good, a ﬁrm has to purchase at least
one unit of the intermediate good. Moreover, ﬁrms face a borrowing constraint of the
following form:
x1 ≤ h(k)
The function h is given exogenously and speciﬁes - as a function of a ﬁrm’s capital -
how much credit it can get. The function h is assumed to be increasing in the capital
level, reﬂecting the assumption that larger ﬁrms are able to get more trade credit.1
1This appears to be in line with real world data. Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) point out that there
is a strong positive correlation between ﬁrm size and access to capital markets. They do,however,
also concede that the size may not be the actual driving force in this correlation. It is also possible
that other factors aﬀecting credit-worthyness are simply correlated with ﬁrm size.
7Additional assumptions on h will be necessary later in this section, once we introduce
some more structure.
The within-period timing works as follows. First, ﬁrms decide in which sector they
want to produce. Notice that ﬁrms make this decision every period, that is, they can
switch between sectors over time. Second, sector 1 produces its output. Third, Sector
2 purchases the intermediate good for price p where p is the per unit price relative
to the ﬁnal product. Sector 2 producers, however cannot pay for the intermediate
good right away, but instead hand over IOUs denominated in the ﬁnal good. These
advances are like those of the Russian oil producers mentioned in the introduction
would do. Fourth, sector 2 produces the ﬁnal good and pays oﬀ its trade credit to
sector 1. Fifth, both sectors make their savings versus consumption decision. Notice
that there is no market for ﬁnal goods.
The equilibrium concept used in this paper is that of recursive competitive equi-
librium and the precise deﬁnition can be found in Appendix 1. Just for reference







ct + kt+1 ≤ max{ptf (kt),(1 − pt)min{h(k),f(k)}} +( 1− δ)kt
ct,k t+1 ≥ 0,k 0 given
8That is, sector 2 households can get trade credit of at most h(k). Given pt, the price
for intermediate goods, the ﬁrm makes its choice between the two sectors, and makes
the savings versus consumption decision. The function h is chosen in such a way that
there is a critical capital level 0 ≤ ¯ k ≤∞with
h(k) ≥ f(k) for k ≥ ¯ k
h(k) <f (k) for k<¯ k
which means that for capital levels low enough the trade credit constraint always
binds.
3 Equilibrium Properties: Steady States
This section is going to characterize steady state equilibria. Let’s start with the case
of no enforcement problems as a benchmark:
3.1 The case of no enforcement problems: ¯ k =0
Proposition 1 If ¯ k =0then p￿ = 1
2∀t.
Proof. In either case p￿ < 1
2 and p￿ > 1
2 market clearing would be violated because
all producers would either operate in sector 2 (if p￿ < 1
2)o rs e c t o r1( i fp￿ > 1
2).




















The steady state capital level is then identical to the one in a standard neoclassical
growth model as stated above.
3.2 The case of ¯ k>0:Enforcement constraint is binding
Now I draw my attention to the interesting case where the economy faces enforcement
constraints. A steady state is characterized by four variables: The two sectors’ capital
levels k￿
1,k ￿
2, the intermediate goods price p￿, and the share of ﬁrms µ￿ working in
sector 1, leaving 1−µ￿ working in sector 2. Three equalities have to hold: The Euler
condition for sector 1 ﬁrms in steady state:
1
β
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10In addition, ﬁrms must prefer to produce in their sector, that is, a ﬁrm holding capital
k￿



















Clearly, the three equations and two inequalities are not enough to pin down the
steady state allocation. Later in this section we show that there are indeed multiple
steady states.
The numerical examples in this section all use the following functional forms:
y1 = Ak
α











with σ,A,q > 0,1 ≥ γ>α .That is, for k ≤ ¯ k =( A/q)
1/(γ−α) , sector 2 ﬁrms are
borrowing constrained. They could potentially produce Akα, but they only get trade
credit for qkγ which limits their production to exactly qkγ. One can think of A as
being the TFP in the production and q being the TFP in the enforcement technology.
Evidently, larger ﬁrms can borrow more in absolute terms, but also the share of trade
credit relative to its own production capacity becomes larger:
q
Akγ−α is an increasing
function, starting at zero. This reﬂects the intuition that a ﬁrm like General Motors
would ﬁnd it hard to run away and hide one quarter worth of car production. On
11the other hand Jeske Inc. might ﬁnd it very easy to run away with the proceeds
of one quarter and hide on the Cayman Islands. This is also consistent with Ickes
(1998) who points out that the ability to issue promissory notes depends on size: Only
large ﬁrms like oil, gas or railway companies are usually able to issue them. Hence,
qualitatively this parametrization has the same ﬂavor as a model with endogenous
borrowing constraints where ﬁrms have the opportunity to run away with a certain
portion of their capital.
Figure 1 plots proﬁt as a function of capital if p<1
2, that is, in the case where in
the absence of trade credit constraints producing in sector 2 would always dominate
sector 1. However, since ﬁrms do face a borrowing constraint it is actually optimal to
produce in sector 1 for low enough capital levels. For capital levels in the intermediate
region between the two kink points ﬁrms would choose to produce in sector 2 but
output is constrained by function h. For capital levels beyond the second kink ﬁrms
produce in sector 2 without a binding credit constraint. For example, if sector 1
builds engines and sector 2 builds cars, then ﬁrms with very little capital (to the left
of the ﬁrst kink point) would rather produce engines themselves. Prices for engines
may be low and therefore proﬁt margins for car manufacturers are high, but a small
ﬁrm could only get credit for very few engines, and therefore can only produce very
few cars. Slightly larger ﬁrms, who have capital in the intermediate region (between
the two kink points) purchase engines via trade credit, even though not as many as















Figure 1: Proﬁt in the two sectors: Max Proﬁt in bold.
13they would like to. They could produce more cars but are able to only buy a limited
number of engines. Therefore, part of their capital is eﬀectively idle. Due to the
low price for engines however, this is still more proﬁtable than producing engines
themselves. Finally, large ﬁrms who are unconstrained choose between producing
f(k) engines and f(k) cars. They go for car production because of the low price for
engines.
Next one can show an interesting result about the source of the reduction in steady
state output of economies with poor enforcement compared to the perfect enforcement
case. Apart from the obvious ineﬃciency due to sector 2 ﬁrms producing h(k) <f(k),
there is another channel for ineﬃciency:
Proposition 3 There are steady state equilibria with output, consumption, and wel-
fare lower than in an economy with perfect enforcement in which f (k￿
2)=h(k￿
2), that
is, there is no waste due to strictly binding borrowing constraints.
Proof. By example: Set
A =1 .00,α=0 .30
q =0 .50,γ=0 .80
At price p￿ =0 .15 steady state capital levels are k￿
1 =0 .1099,k ￿
2 = ¯ k =4 .000. Market
clearing dictates that a share of µ￿ =0 .7462 of the ﬁrms works in sector 1 and the
remaining 1−µ￿ =0 .2538 work in sector 2. Output in steady state is 0.3847 compared
14to 0.4319 in the economy with perfect enforcement, even though sector 2 ﬁrms have
a borrowing constraint which is only weakly binding: y2 = f (k￿
2)=h(k￿
2).
This result demonstrates that the ineﬃciency occurs even in situations in which
f (k￿
2)=h(k￿
2), that is, in steady state sector 2 ﬁrms operate at full capacity and
the borrowing constraint is not limiting the amount of output produced. The lower
output in this case is due to the low price for intermediate goods: As mentioned
in the introduction, Sector 1 producers have a high marginal product but do not
accumulate more capital because of the low price they receive for their product. On
the other hand, capital is wasted in the ﬁnal goods sector because it is operating at
high capital levels with low marginal products. Essentially one can think of this as an
externality: The marginal product - which is what a social planner would care about
- is diﬀerent from the marginal proﬁt of capital due to a price p<1
2, in particular,
the social marginal product of sector 2 capital is very low, but since intermediate
goods are so inexpensive the personal marginal proﬁt of capital is high and capital is





























the steady state capital level with perfect enforcement, one can ﬁnd cases where
k￿
1 <k pe <k ￿
2. Given that the production function f is concave it is easy to construct
15an example where ﬁnal goods output is higher in the perfect enforcement case. Notice
however that this is not a direct application of Jensen’s inequality since in general it
is not the case that µ￿k￿
1 +( 1− µ￿)k￿
2 = kpe.
A useful measure for comparing the severity of the distortionary eﬀect coming
from the borrowing constraint is what I want to call the implicit TFP, deﬁned as
follows:
Deﬁnition 4 Suppose an economy using aggregate capital level K produces aggre-
gate output Y. The implicit TFP (total factor productivity) is deﬁned as the TFP
necessary to produce Y with capital level K in the absence of borrowing constraints:
Aimpl = Y/K
α
For example, in the perfect enforcement economy the implicit TFP would be 1
2A.
The further apart Aimpl and 1
2A are, the stronger is the eﬀect of the credit constraint
in steady state.
Next, let’s go through a numerical example to see how macro-economic variables
depend on the choice of parameters. We use the same example as in the previous
proposition, but with varying values for the parameter q which can be viewed as a
measure for the enforcement technology. High values for q make the credit constraint
less binding, whereas low values of q cause the region in which sector 2 ﬁrms are credit
constrained to become larger.
16Moreover, the example demonstrates that there can be multiple steady states.
Consequently, for each variable we compute the minimum and the maximum value
relative to the perfect enforcement case. Numerically this is easy to do: On a grid
between 0 and 1
2 for the price p one can compute the steady state capital levels in the
two sectors by using the Euler conditions. After that one has to check that ﬁrms with
capital k￿
i would actually prefer producing in sector i. The distribution of capital,
that is, the value for µ follows directly from the market clearing condition.
Figure 2 plots the result from the exercise. For low enough values of q both
output and capital are lower than in the perfect enforcement case and also increasing
in q.Surprisingly, there are cases where steady state capital and even output levels are
higher for incomplete enforcement economies. The reason for this is over-investment
in sector 2 capital. Intermediate goods prices are for low values of q w h i c hc a u s e sh i g h
proﬁt margins and low marginal product of capital in sector 2. Notice that welfare is
still lower in economies with bad enforcement and the reason is that too much capital
is being used so that consumption is lower in steady state.
Not surprisingly the implicit TFP is strictly increasing in q, t h a ti s ,e v e ni nt h e
region where output is higher than in the perfect enforcement case, aggregate capital
input is higher by such a large margin that Y/Kα is pushed below the implicit TFP
of an economy without enforcement problems.




















capital relative to perfect enforcement
q







implicit TFP relative to perfect enforcement
q
Figure 2: Output, capital, impl. TFP as functions of enforcement parameter q.
184 How to pin down a unique steady state
For the remainder of the paper it is assumed that the function h takes a particular
form:
h(k)=qk, q > 2(1/β − 1+δ)
that is, ﬁrms can get trade credit up to a certain share of their capital holdings.
This assumption simpliﬁes the analysis because now it is certain that in steady state
either the ﬁrst best outcome is achieved where constraints are not binding and both
sectors operate at the same capital level, or ﬁrms operate at diﬀerent capital levels
and sector 2 ﬁrms operate at the kink point k￿, where h(k)=f(k). This happens








< 1/β − 1+δ
The reason for multiplicity of steady states is of course the non-concavity of the
proﬁt function. Because of this there is an incentive to borrow and lend capital, but
not necessarily between ﬁrms of diﬀerent capital levels but among ﬁrms with the same
capital level, namely those producing at levels in the non-concave region of the proﬁt
function. Firms of diﬀerent capital levels have no incentive to borrow and lend in
steady state because
∂proﬁt
∂k is equalized between the two sectors. However, if ﬁrms
19have a k such that
∃klow,k high : klow <k<k high
and




they could be better oﬀ by pooling their capital and opening a share of λ ﬁrms of size
klow and (1 − λ) ﬁrms of size khigh. This can also be viewed as share λ of ﬁrms each
lending (k − klow) units of capital at interest rate
π(khigh)−π(klow)
khigh−klow . One can easily check
that at the end of the period all ﬁrms make identical proﬁt λπ(klow)+(1− λ)π(khigh)
under this arrangement.
Naturally, the klow,k high will be chosen in order to maximize the proﬁt from pooling
capital. That is, the maximum proﬁt function can be thought of as the minimal
concave function among those uniformly greater or equal than the original proﬁt
function. This function is depicted in Figure 3. Since h is linear, khigh is given by
the intersection of the h and f functions, that is, the point at which the borrowing
constraint is just weakly binding. klow is given by the capital level such that the
marginal proﬁt in sector 1 is equal to the interest rate in the pooling region.
The next result establishes that when ﬁrms can trade capital, then the steady
state capital usage is pinned down uniquely.





























Figure 3: Max Proﬁt with pooling in bold. Without pooling: Dotted line.
21Proposition 5 If ﬁrms can borrow and lend capital among each other there is a
unique price p￿ such that either the credit constraint is not binding, in which case
p￿ =1 /2 and there are klow = khigh ≥ ¯ k such that f￿(klow)=1 /β−1+δ, or khigh = ¯ k,
and there is a klow <k high such that the slope of the linear portion in the proﬁt
function in ﬁgure 3 is equal to 1/β − 1+δ.
Proof. In the appendix.
Notice that the klow,k high in the proposition are the capital levels used in produc-
tion. The result still allows for multiplicity of capital ownership, though. In other
words, uniqueness applies only to the macro-economic variables output, aggregate
capital level, and the price level but not to the capital distribution.
Going through the same type of numerical exercise as in the previous section,
this time with γ =1 .0, we can again plot output, capital, and implicit TFP relative
to the perfect enforcement case as a function of the enforcement parameter q,b u t
now for the one unique steady state. This is done in Figure 4.2 Qualitatively, the
results in the case of a unique steady state are similar to those in the previous section.
Initially, capital is increasing in q, because as enforcement becomes better, both the
2The reader may notice that in the graphs the lower bound on q is (1/β − 1+δ) ≈ 0.21, whereas
e a r l i e ri nt h es e c t i o ni tw a sa s s u m e dt h a tq>2(1/β − 1+δ). This lower bound is extremely tight
because it only assumed that p ∈ (0,1/2), whereas in the numerical example p → 0 fast enough as
q → (1/β − 1+δ) so that for q ∈ [(1/β − 1+δ),2(1/β − 1+δ)], the linear section in the proﬁt
function is still steeper than (1/β − 1+δ).
22share of ﬁrms working in sector 2 increases and the increasing price for intermediate
goods causes the capital used in sector 1 to increase. After a certain point, at roughly






, the amount of capital used in
sector 2, is decreasing in q and this eﬀect dominates the previous two. For low enough
values of q output can be made arbitrarily small relative to perfect enforcement. As
before, however, output can also be higher than in the perfect enforcement case, which
comes at a price of much higher capital levels. Consequently, implicit TFP is below
the one, as long as credit constraints cause an intermediate goods price of less than
one half. Welfare is still lower in economies with weak enforcement, though. This
can be easily seen in the graphs: Output is larger by about up to 15% but it comes
at the cost of capital levels that are higher by about 100%. Depreciation therefore
pushes the amount of output dedicated to consumption below its level under perfect
enforcement.
5 Conclusion
To use the language of Prescott (1997), this paper develops a theory of diﬀerences in
TFP through diﬀerences in enforcement of contracts. Precisely, this paper looks at
incomplete enforcement of intra-period debt, which can be thought of as trade credit.
The necessity for this intra-period borrowing comes from the timing of the production
process: Sector 1 output is produced ﬁrst and it is employed as an intermediate good





output relative to perfect enforcement






capital relative to perfect enforcement








implicit TFP relative to perfect enforcement
q
Figure 4: Output, capital, and implicit TFP as a function of q.
24in the sector 2 production process, so that sector 2 has an intra-period ﬁnancing need
to pay for intermediate goods before its own production takes place.
If there is risk of default on this intra-period credit we can show a number of results:
Prices for intermediate goods are lower in economies with imperfect enforcement of
intra-period credit. This causes a skewed capital distribution with many small ﬁrms
operating at high marginal products of capital and a few large ﬁrms that are very
unproductive. The reason is that the credit constraint encourages sector 2 producers
to operate at relatively large capital levels, and the low productivity is oﬀset by high
proﬁt margins in that sector. The misallocation of capital from small ﬁrms into one
sector that operates at low productivity causes TFP to be lower than in the perfect
enforcement economy.
In the benchmark economy without capital markets, the proﬁt function is non-
concave, which gives rise to the possibility of multiple steady states. Opening capital
markets goes half-way in solving this problem: Aggregate values in steady state,
including capital used in the two sectors, are uniquely pinned down. However, the
capital ownership distribution is still not uniquely determined.
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266 Appendix 1: Equilibrium deﬁnition
In order to deﬁne a recursive equilibrium, here is some preliminary work: Let A be the
set of possible capital holdings (for example A = R++ w o u l db ea na d e q u a t ec h o i c e )
and B(A) be the Borel σ-algebra of A. Let M be the set of all probability measures
on the measurable space M =( A,B(A)). Let Φ ∈Mdenote the distribution of ﬁrms’









￿ ≤ max{p(Φ)f (k),(1 − p(Φ))min{h(k),f(k)}} +( 1− δ)k
Φ
￿ = H (Φ)
where H : M→Mis the law of motion for the capital distribution, and the function
p(Φ) is the market clearing price for capital distribution Φ.
Finally we can specify what an equilibrium is:
Deﬁnition 6 A recursive equilibrium is:
• A value function v : A ×M→R .
• Policy functions for next period’s capital k￿ : A×M→Rand for consumption
c : A ×M→R .
27• A pricing function p : M→R .
• A law of motion for capital distributions: H : M→M .
such that:
• v,k￿,care measurable with respect to B(A).
• v satisﬁes the Bellman equation.
• k￿,cand the sector choices are the optimal decision rules.
• Decision rule k￿ generates the aggregate law of motion for capital.
• Sector choices generate market clearing in intermediate and ﬁnal goods.
Remark 7 This equilibrium deﬁnition is a little bit sloppy, because in equilibrium it
is possible that market clearing can only be achieved with randomization across the
two sectors. This would be the case if there is a point mass of ﬁrms being indif-
ferent between the two sectors, and these ﬁrms would potentially have to randomize
between the two sectors in order for markets to clear. To address this eventuality one
would have to introduce another policy function s : A ×M→[0,1] that speciﬁes the
probability of choosing sector 1, but the notation would get rather messy.
287 Appendix 2: Uniqueness of steady state
In the economy with the (weakly) concave proﬁt function steady state capital levels
that ﬁrms own may not be unique, however the capital levels used in production
are unique. We need to prove that there is a unique 3-tuple (p,klow,k high) such that











or we are in the contained case:









where klow,k high are the endpoints of the linear portion in the concave proﬁt function
from above.





, the kink point at which the credit constraint for sector 2









































(since f concave, klow < ¯ k)




<ρ+ δ. In this case there can be no steady state with p = 1
2,
because at the proposed capital levels sector 2 ﬁrms’ credit constraint would be strictly





such that the linear
part of the proﬁt function has slope ρ + δ.E v i d e n t l y , khigh = ¯ k, as before. Deﬁne







Notice, that k1(p) is equal to klow if and only if p is the steady state price level. Deﬁne
i1(p) as the intercept of the tangency line going through the point (k1(p),pf(k1(p)))
and i1(p) as the intercept of a line with slope (ρ + δ) going trough




i1(p)=pf (k1(p)) − (ρ + δ)k1(p)
i2(p)=( 1 − p)f
¯ k

− (ρ + δ)¯ k
30Let y(p) be the diﬀerence between the two intercepts.
y(p)=i2(p) − i1(p)
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Notice that y is continuous and decreasing in p and:
y(0) = A¯ k


















=0 , by deﬁnition of ¯ k.






















































































< 0. Consequently, there is a unique steady state price p and
therefore unique steady state capital levels klow,k high. QED.
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